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The international debt crisis of1982 revealed that unre-
cordedprivate capital outflowsfrom developing countries
occurred simultaneously with borrowing from interna-
tional commercial banks. Current interest in capitalflight
hasbeen generatedby thepossibility that the resurgence of
private capital inflows to these countries may be limited to
the return of.flight capital. A simple publicfinance model
shows that simultaneous capital outflows and inflows can
beexplainedas the resultofprivateinternationalarbitrage
of domestic policies. Tr.e paper discusses tlu! welfare
consequences of gross two-way capital flows that take
advantage ofopportunities to avoid taxation or generate
subsidy income.
In the aftermath of the 1982 international debt crisis,
economists were surprised to lea..rn that alarge part ofthe
borrowingofdeveloping countries from internationalcom-
mercialbanks was matchednotby netimportsofgoods and
services, butinsteadby unrecordedprivatecapitaloutflows
from developing countries. A satisfactory explanation for
whyresidents ofacountrysimultaneously borrow andlend
on international markets clearly calls for a model that
explains patterns of financial intermediation rather than
conventional models for net investment opportunities in
different countries.
This article focuses on a measure of "capital flight"
developed in Dooley (1986) that captures unrecorded pri-
vate capital outflows and on a number of theoretical
models that might help understand this measure ofcapital
flight. Interest in capital flight recently has beenrekindled
by the resurgence ofprivate capital inflows to developing
countries after nearly a decade of very limited capital
flows. At issue is whether this reflects a "discovery" of
emerging markets by residents ofindustrial countries or a
return of capital flight by residents of the developing
countries. In eithercase, itis aprivate capitalinflow. Butif
the "homebias" ofportfolios ofindustrial countries really
is being reduced, then the potential for continued inflows
seems very large; in contrast, if the "home bias" of resi-
dents ofdevelopingcountriesis beingincreasedby areduc-
tion of capital flight claims on industrial countries, the
scope for continued private inflows is quite limited. The
data seem more consistent with the second interpretation.
We are concerned with the sources ofcapital flight and
with the welfare consequences of capital flight in the
presence of the policy and institutional environment that
gives riseto it. Thenextsectionelaboratesonthe definition
and estimation of capital flight and reports estimates of
capitalflight from 1971-1991 for a sampleof84developing
countries. Section II presents a simple public finance
model to discuss the effects ofdifferent tax treatments for
resident and nonresident holders of claims on domestic
assets. Section III analyzes capital flight using this model
and emphasizes that capital income taxation that varies de
facto by residence and source leads to two-way gross
financial capital flows. The model incorporates a welfare-
improving role for capital income taxes. The welfare









from the balance of payments data and to the estimated
total ofexternal claims for several majordebtor countries.
These estimates suggest that a significant share ofthe in-
comeearnedfrom claimsonnonresidents is notreportedin
the balance of payments system and therefore is attribut-
able to the returns to flight capital. The difference between
the estimate of total external claims by nonresidents ex-
cludingdirect investmentabroad andthe estimateofassets
on which interest earnings are reported is the estimate of
capital flight intended to measure claims on nonresidents
that are beyond the control ofthe home government. This
procedure leads to largerestimates ofcapital flight than of
unrecorded external debt accumulations plus errors and
omissions.
Claessens and Naude (1993) updated estimates ofcapi-
tal flight using this definition ("theDooley Measure") for
84 developing countries between 1971 and 1991; their
results are summarized in Figure I, which also shows an
estimate of capital flight sometimes used by the World
Bank (the "World Bank Residual Measure"). The com-
parison of these two measures is interesting because they
are conceptually identical except that the "Dooley Meas-
ure" subtracts gross claims for which interest income is
reported in the balance ofpayments.
FIGUREl
COMPARISON OF MEASURES OF CAPITAL FLIGHT
IN ANNUAL FLOWS
I. DEFINITION AND MAGNITUDE
OF CAPITAL FLIGHT
restrictions its possibility imposes on the effectiveness of
these taxes and, therefore, on the fiscal instruments for a
social welfare-maximizing government.
Section IV discusses the welfare effects ofcapital flight
in the presence offinancial market imperfections. In this
case, capital flight can lead to inefficient international
allocations of physical capital stocks. In Section V, sub-
sidies to foreign lenders and their contribution to capital
flight are discussed. Section VI concludes.
We define "flightcapital" as theaccumulationofresidents'
claims on nonresidents that escape control by domestic
governments-that is, that are not subject to taxation,
regulation, or, in extreme circumstances, confiscation.
The method for estimating capital flight (Dooley 1986,
1988)involvescalculatingthetotalstockofexternalclaims:
Specifically, sum recorded claims on nonresidents less
direct investments abroad using balance ofpayments data,
cumulated errors and omissions from the balance ofpay-
ments accounts, andanestimateoftheunrecorded stockof
external claims. The starting value for the cumulated
balance of payments data is estimated by capitalizing
investment income receipts for the initial year; errors and
omissions are included because they often are associated
with accumulations of financial claims on nonresidents
that might include unrecorded capital flows along with
many other forms ofassets.
The balance ofpayments data are known to underesti-
mate seriously the full stock of external debt (using the
World Bank data, among other sources). Ifthese data are
correct, then some sortofbalancingtransactions also must
be underestimated. These can include any type offoreign
transaction, including imports of goods and services or
purchases offinancial claims on nonresidents financed by
the accumulation of unrecorded external debt. Since the
type oftransactioncannotbediscerned, we assume thatall
ofthe unrecorded debt increases are balanced by increases
in private claims on nonresidents that are not reported in
the balance ofpayments records.
Next we subtract the stock ofclaims implied by invest-
ment income receipts and market interest rates. Because
this stock of claims represents the portion that earns
income reported inthe balance ofpayments accounts, and
therefore is within the control of domestic authorities, it
can be considered to result from normal portfolio diver-
sification motives rather than from capital flight.
Dooley (1986) compares the yield implied by reported
investment income to the accumulated external claimsClearly, this distinction made little difference for the
quantitative measure of capital flight for this group
ofcountries until 1990 and 1991. The dramatic reversal of
capital flight in 1990 and 1991 according to the "Dooley
Measure" helps explain the large recorded capital inflows
thathave dominatedrecent developments inemergingmar-
kets. Indeed, to the best ofour knowledge, this finding is
the only direct evidence in support ofnumerous specula-
tions that what appear to be purchases ofemerging market
assets by residents of industrial countries are in fact the
return offlight capital.
As Claessens and Naude point out, the divergence
between the two measures reflects the fact that reported
investment income in 1991 was double that level for 1989,
while interest rates on dollar-denominated instruments fell
by about 30percent. Ourinterpretation ofthese data is that
residents ofdeveloping countries have soldofftheircapital
flight positions in orderto purchase assets denominated in
their home countries' domestic currencies. This is incor-
rectly recorded as an increase in liabilities to nonresidents
in the developing country's balance ofpayments. The cor-
rectentry would be a reduction ofprivate residents' claims
on nonresidents. About halfofthis inflow has been offset
by official exchange market intervention or by an increase
in official claims on nonresidents. Since the interest in-
come on official reserves is recorded in the balance of
payments, the "Dooley Measure" correctly captures the
decline in the stock of private flight capital. Moreover,
the magnitude ofthe reversal ofcapital flight in1990-1991
is greater than OECD estimates of all private borrowing
by non-OECD countries on international capital markets.
While interesting in themselves, these data tell us nothing
about the motivation behind two-way capital flows that
have dominated international financial markets for the past
20years. Forthat, we turnto alternativemodels ofinterna-
tional financial intermediation in the following sections.
n. PUBLIC FINANCE MODEL
The analytical framework for capital flight developed in
this section emphasizes the role ofpolicies adopted by the
domestic government and residents' opportunity to avoid
the impact ofthose policies on the net income from their
assetholdings. Policiesoftentreatresidentandnonresident
holders ofclaims on domestic assets differently. As a con-
sequence, capital flight and external capital inflows canbe
seen as an outcome ofinternational arbitrage ofdomestic
policies. In practice, the types of policies that can lead
to capital flight vary by residence of the investor, and
can include explicit capital income taxes, restrictions on
the menu of assets available to residents different from
those available to nonresidents, subsidies-includingcon-
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tingentones-toinvestment by nonresidents, and outright
confiscation.
The effective taxation ofcapital income frequently var-
ies both by its source and by the residence ofits recipient.
In many cases, domestic investors' total tax burden on
capital income exceeds that offoreign holders ofdomestic
claims. When residents hold assets beyond the reach of
their home government, they will tend to realize higher
risk-adjusted post-tax returns for claims on nonresidents
than for claims on domestic assets. Under these cir-
cumstances, foreign creditors can have an incentive to
invest in domestic assets when residents do not. Such
differences in effective rates of taxation of asset income
will lead to gross capital outflows and inflows that are
unrecorded in balance ofpayments dataexceeding any net
capital flow.
Itis oftenmuchmoredifficultto avoid payingresidence-
based capital income taxes on income earnedfrom domes-
tic assets than from claims on nonresidents unreported
to domestic fiscal authorities. Such taxes become both
residence-based and source-based, de facto applying only
to domestic capital income earned by residents. The taxes
that can lead to differential burdens for residents and
foreign holders of domestic claims may be anticipated
ratherthan statutory. For example, in many cases residents
canhold only deposits in the domestic banking system that
are denominated in the domestic currency and are subject
to a reserve requirement, while foreign investors can
acquire claims on domestic intermediaries denominated in
foreign currency that do not require the holding of non-
interest-bearing reserves. Resident savers usually receive
below-market interest rates on reserves and face potential
inflation taxes on these deposits, so that nonresidents
receive a higher anticipated post-tax rate of return for
claims on domestic capital.
More generally, when residents do not have access to the
same range of domestic financial instruments as do non-
residents, the contingent taxes imposed by and subsidies
provided by domestic authorities differfor the two types of
creditors. Forexample, external debt may be denominated
in foreign currency while domestic deposits may only be
available denominated in local currency. Nonresidents can
purchase an asset yielding a different distribution of re-
turns than residents can. As a consequence, the risks and
returns associated with domestic claims differ by the
residence ofthe investor. This leads to internationalportfo-
lio diversification, but it does not by itself lead to capital
flight. Capital flight arises when residents avoid antici-
pated taxation ofdomestic deposits (for example, through
inflation) and of the gross earnings on reported foreign
assets. Acquisition of assets abroad for both groups then
represents international arbitrage of these tax rules orC1 + B + (K - Kf) = y,
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anticipated levies. The extent to which residents take
advantageofsuchopportunities is estimatedby a measure-
ment ofthe claims on nonresidents that are unreported in
the balance ofpayments records.
One concern over capital flight is that private external
debts are socialized, or the payments on these debts are
subsidized by the government. These can lead to the
accumulation of private claims on nonresidents by resi-
dents thatdo notprovide foreign exchangeearnings avaiia-
ble to the public sector for debt interest payments. Such
subsidies, which often are contingent liabilities for the
government, provide benefits for foreign lenders and,
possibly, private domestic investors.
These ideas canbeaddressedmoreformally ina stylized
two-period model ofa small open economy with a single
composite good that can be used for private consumption,
public consumption, and investment. In the first period,
the country has an initial endowment of the good, and
households choose a consumption and saving allocation.
Domestic saving can be allocated to investment in home
capital or used to purchase claims on nonresident capital
earnings. External borrowing also is possible, allowing
nonresidents to acquire claims on income produced by
domestic capital. In the second period, output and net
incomefrominvestmentabroad areallocatedtoprivateand
publicconsumption. The governmentprovides public con-
sumption goods and raises revenue using non-lump-sum
taxes. The instruments available to the fiscal authority
include taxes on labor income, source-based taxes on do-
mesticcapitalincome, andresidence-basedtaxes oninvest-
ment income. Taxes can be levied at positive or negative
rates (subsidies).
Fiscal authorities face difficulties enforcing compliance
with taxes on foreign source income. We assume that
domestic residents are able to invest in foreign claims
providing income that is beyond the control of national
authorities and therefore untaxable in practice. The model
also allows domestic capital income paid to foreign resi-
dentstobetaxed at differentratesfrom homesourcecapital
income paid to residents.
Production ofoutput requires inputs oflabor and capi-
tal using a standard concave technology, given in labor-
intensive form byj(k). Thehousehold sectoris represented
by a single household with the utility function
Domestic claims on nonresidents are denoted byB, and
foreign claims on domestic capital are denoted Kf The
share of the domestic capital stock owned by residents is
the difference between K andKf Note that foreign claims
on residents and residents' claims on foreigners are gross.
This model parallels that ofRazin and Sadka (1989), but
they do not allow nonresident claims on residents.
The household budget constraints in each period, re-
spectively, are given by
(2)
and
(3) C2 = B (l + r*(1 - z tr))
+ (K - Kf) (l + r(1 - tr)(1 - ts))
+ wl (l - t[).
The tax rate on capital income by residence is given by tr,
the tax rate on domestic source capital income is given by
ts' and the tax on labor income is given by t[. The rate of
compliance with residence-based capital income taxes for
assets held abroad is measured by z, which takes values
between zero and unity: When z is zero, domestic fiscal
authorities are unable to tax any of the earnings from
claims on nonresidents held by residents; when z is unity,
evasion of investment income taxes is not possible. The
initialendowmentofthe compositegoodisy, thewagerate
is w, the domestic (pre-tax) interestrate is r andthe foreign
interest rate is r* (net ofany foreign source-based taxes).
Suppose that international financial capital mobility is
unrestrictedandthatthis countryis smallrelativetotherest
ofthe world. Thenforeign savings always will flow intothe
domestic economy ifthe post-tax rate ofreturn to foreign
capital is less than the rate of return to domestic capital
after source-based taxes. In equilibrium, the post-tax rate
ofreturn to foreign capital, r*, must be atleast as great as
the post-source-based-tax rate ofreturn to domestic capi-
tal, (1-ts)r. Therefore, foreign savers will hold claims on
domestic capital only if these two net rates of return are
equal. Ifr* exceeds (1-ts)r, then domestic residents also
earn a higher return to claims on foreign capital than on
domestic capital after source-based and residence-based
taxes are imposed, so thatthe domestic capital stockwould
be zero.1 Therefore, assuming that the Inada conditions2
(1) U = u(c1, c2' 1) + v(g)
where C1' C2' 1, andgarefirst-period consumption, second-
period consumption, leisure consumption, and public
goods consumption, respectively. Theinitialendowmentof
leisure is L. For simplicity, household preferences are
additively separable between public goods and private
goods consumption.
1. This holds for any zbetweenzero andoneas long as tris non-negative.
Italso holds for a residence-based subsidy (tr negative) when z is one.
When a subsidy is paid, z should be one, since rational savers would
comply fully.
2. These are thatf'(k) tends to infinity as k tends to zero andf'(k) tends
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ill. CAPITAL FLIGHT AND
THE PuBLIC FINANCE PROBLEM
Household optimization yields consumption demands that
depend upon the tax rates through their effects on the in-
come and the relative priceofsecond-periodconsumption.
(5) r* (l - z tr) > (1 - ts) (1 - tr) r.
Equilibrium demand for capital by the firm in the home
count..ry is determined by equality ofthe marginal product
ofcapital and the pre-tax rate ofinterest:
holdforf(k), we have inequilibriumunderperfectfinancial
capital mobility that
(4) r* = (l - ts)r.
Ifz is less than one, then we also have that
income that distort consumption-leisure choices and la-
bor supply. Source-based taxes are assumed to be enforce-
able, buttheseresult indifferent marginal productivities of
capital at home and abroad. Again, the optimal tax rule is
found by straightforward maximization of representative
household utility subject to the necessary conditions for
private optimization by the household and firm and the
constraint that residence-based taxes raise no revenue.
Social welfare is reduced by the possibility of capital
flight in this model. This is because capital flight is a
consequence of the ability of households to avoid capital
income taxes levied on a residence basis. The effective
marginal tax rate on capital that can be achieved. on a
residence basis is zero. Reducing the residence-based
capitalincometaxrateto zerocaneliminatecapitalflight in
this model (for arbitrarily small transactions costs associ-
atedwiththe acquisition offoreign assets) andresults inno
loss oftaxrevenue. Therestrictioninthe setofdistortionary
fiscal instruments available to the government results in
lower maximized social welfare. Capital flight is another
consequence and the channel through which residents
escape the control ofnational fiscal authorities.
Itshould be noted thatbothenforceable residence-based
and source-based capital income taxes affect the netexter-
nal assetpositionofthecountry. Ingeneral, anincreaseina
source-based tax will lead to a net capital outflow, an
increase in a residence-based tax will cause a net capital
inflow, and with enforceable taxes of both types, the net
andgross capital outflow willbeequal. However, thisisnot
the case when residents cannot be effectively taxed on
foreign asset earnings. In the case of this model with no
constraints on externalfinancial capitalinflows, all domes-
tic saving goes abroad if tr is positive and all domestic
capital income is owed to foreign residents. The gross
outflow is much larger than the net capital outflow, which
may be positive or negative. This is because domestic
authorities can only effectively tax domestic capital in-
come, although at different rates for nonresident and for
resident claimants.
Given that capital flight is possible, the social welfare-
maximizing government would choose to impose controls
on financial capital outflows. Such restrictions can help to
resolve the public finance problem for the government by
reducing the ability ofresidents to acquire assets earning
income thatcannotbetaxed. Imposing acomplete (assum-
ing enforceability) ban on the acquisition ofall claims on
nonresidents leads to a domestic marginal product of
capital that is no greater than the foreign rate ofinterest:
(8) (1 - ts)f'(k) = r*, ifK!> 0, and




Supposethat domestic savers cannotavoidresidence-based
capitalincometaxes by purchasingclaimsonnonresidents.
In this case, a small country social planner choosing to
maximize the welfare of the representative household
optimizes by financing public goods spending using a
combination of a labor income tax and a residence-based
capital income tax. In the solution, the rate of source-
basedcapital income taxation is zero, so thatthe first-order
condition for an optimum
is satisfied.
The solution for the optimal tax and public goods supply
problem when there is no issue oftax compliance is well-
known. The rates oftax imposed on labor income and on
interestincomeofresidents arechosen so thatthedisutility
ofthe last unit ofrevenue raised from each is equal when
both taxes are positive. We skip elaborating this rule
analytically. It should be noted that such an equilibrium
plan is not Pareto efficient iflabor supply is not perfectly
elastic, since all taxes are distortionary.
Now suppose that both source-based and residence-
based taxes are available to domestic fiscal authorities, but
that residents are able to avoid taxes on claims on foreign
capital earnings (z = 0). In this case, any positive rate of
residence-based capital income tax implies that no domes-
tic claims are held by residents and all domestic capital
income is paid to foreign claimants. In the absence of
controls on financial capital outflows, the government
collects no revenue from residence-based capital income
taxes, and all public consumption spending must be fi-
nanced by taxes on capitalearnings that distorttheinterna-
tional allocation of production activities and on labor
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to be satisfied, then full tax compliance andperfectcapital
controls are substitutes.3
3. Razin and Sadka derive the optimal restriction oncapitaloutflows for
their model in which domestic capital cannot be purchased by foreign
residents. When residents' foreign capital income cannotbe taxed at the
same rate as their income from domestic capital, optimal capital
The equilibrium domestic interest rate can be below the
foreign interest rate when no residence-based and source-
basedcapitalincometaxes areimposedifdomestic savings
are adequateto finance alldomestic capital. Inthis case, an
appropriate choice ofthe residence-based, orequivalently,
source-based, capital income tax can be made so that the
marginal productivity of capital is equal across borders.
However, even ifenforceable capital controls are feasi-
ble the potential for capital flight still can pose a public
finance problem. The optimal policy for a governmentthat
maximizes the household's utility is to impose capital
controls at some positive level and a residence-based
capital income tax along with a positive rate of labor
income tax in the general case for this model. It will never
be optimal to choose capital income taxes that lead to the
inequality
That is, such a government will not want to impose a
source-based or residence-based tax (with the caveat that
this applies only to residents' holdings ofdomestic finan-
cial assets) and level of capital control thatresults in a
marginal productivity ofcapital below the foreign margi-
nal productivity of capital. If it did, it could relax the
quantitative restraint on capital outflows and/orthe rate of
taxation of domestic capital income and tax rate on labor
income to reduce the home capital stock and achieve a
more efficient allocation of domestic saving and global
production.
The optimal tax and quantitative restriction on capital
outflows can lead to an equilibrium in which domestic
saving and investment are equal and the marginal produc-
tivity of domestic capital is less than the foreign interest
rate. The reason is simply that the optimal level ofpublic
goods spending and distortionary effect ofa labor income
tax with no capital outflow imply a higher rate oftaxation
on domestic capital than allowed by the restriction that
I'(k) equal r*, when kequals equilibrium domestic saving
per unit oflabor. Capital controls are a second-best fiscal
policy instrument to enforceable taxes on capital income
from all sources for residents in such cases. When the
optimum allows the equality
r*+p=r,
r* > (1 - trHr* + p), (11)
(10)
where p is this premium.
Considera specialcaseinwhichdomestic saving andin-
vestment are equal and the rates of interest at home and
abroad are equalin the absenceofany capitalincome taxes
inthehomecountry. Supposethatthe domestic government
now imposes a residence-based capital income tax such
that
In addition to the problemofefficientrevenue collectionto
finance public spending programs, other welfare costs can
beassociatedwithcapitalflight inducedby domestic taxes.
One suchcostmay bedue to intermediaries' preferences to
invest in projects in their home country. For example, it is
reasonable to think that intermedia.ries face lower costs of
acquiring information about a borrower's actions and ap-
pealing to the power of the state to ensure contractual
compliance when they lend within their home country.
When information is imperfect, so that monitoring is
costly, intermediaries may not invest abroad, even if the
otherwise risk-adjusted expected rate of return is higher.
In the presence of such intermediation bias, claims on
nonresidents will tend to increase foreign capital stocks
and reduce domestic capital stocks, ceteris paribus. A
simple model illustrates the point. Suppose that foreign
intermediaries require a premiumfor investmentreturns in
the small country over the interest they are able to earn at
home. In an equilibrium with positive external inflows of
financial capital,
IV PREFERENCES OF INTERMEDIARIES
FOR INVESTING AT HOME OR ABROAD
controls are set so that the equilibriumcapital stockexceeds that which
is optimalifall capitalincome ofresidents canbe taxed. Thisis due to a
distortion caused by the tax on domestic capital income and the
productiondistortion (marginalreductioninnationalincome) caused by
capital controls.
This result does not follow in our model since the domestic capital
stockis determined bythe marginalconditionsfor foreign investors. For
a given source-based capital income tax, binding controls on capital
outflows lead to a one-far-one substitution of nonresident for resident
ownership ofcapital. The optimal source-based tax does not depend on
whether or not foreign capital earnings of domestic residents can be
taxed at the same rate as their domestic capital income.
and (10) holds. This implies that capital flight occurs
accordingto the definitionusedinthispaper. Imposition of
the tax reduces the domestic capital stock per worker,
raisingj'(k) from r* to r* + p. Ifa tax rate low enough to
reverse the inequality in (11) is imposed, then we have
(12) r* = (1 - tr) r,
j'(k) < r*.
j'(k) = j'*'(k*) (7)
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where s is the subsidy rate. Byitself, this is not sufficientto
cause capital flight as defined here. Domestic residents
have an incentive only to purchase claims onnonresidents,
but not to place these outside the control of the domestic
government.
Subsidies differ from capital income taxes in that the
limits on the magnitude of the gross flows are different.
The gross capital outflow underperfect international capi-
talmobility whenacapitalincome tax is leviedonlyonres-
idents is given by the total ofdomestic savings. The oppor-
tunity return on domestic assets held by residents is less
thanthereturnto flight capital, butthe opportunityinterest
cost of borrowing externally is the same as the inter-
est received by relending. If foreign borrowing is sub-
sidized, then the limit on resources that might be available
for investing abroad at a net gain is the extent to which
the subsidy will be offered, that is, the extent to which the
government will subsidize borrowing from abroad to pur-
chase claims onnonresidents thatitcannottax. This might
be called the "extent ofthe government's stupidity."
dents that is unavailable to residents. Private intermedi-
aries frequently have been able to borrow from abroad
under explicit or implicit government guarantees of the
debts to the foreign creditors. These guarantees canhave
adverse incentive effects for investment choices by the
intermediaries, thus leading to the standard arguments for
public monitoring of investment actions by publicly in-
sured intermediaries. Domestic intermediaries have an
incentive to invest in risky projects since they receive
returns only inthe uppertail ofthe distribution for returns.
In the absence of adequate monitoring of the actions of
domestic investors, domestic saversmayanticipatethatdo-
mestic external borrowing will lead to higher tax rates in
the future because, as domestic intermediaries maximize
their expectedreturns by selecting risky projects, thevalue
ofthe contingent liability ofthe government rises. Antici-
pated future capital income taxes will induce capital flight
ifitis possible to place assets beyondthereach ofdomestic
authorities. Eaton (1987) presents a model based on these
notions inwhichthere aremultiple equilibria, oneofwhich
involves no capital flight and private debt repayment and
another which involves capital flight and private default.
The role of subsidies to foreign investors for capital
flight can be discussed in the model used to analyze the
effects of taxes on capital income accruing to residents.
Subsidies available to nonresident asset holders but not to
residentinvestors underperfectinternationalfinancial cap-
ital mobility will leadto an increaseinthe domestic capital
stock and cause all domestic savings to be placed abroad,
since equilibrium requires that
in equilibrium, and there are no capital inflows, although
there is anet capital outflow as residents acquire claims on
nonresidents.
The presence of financial market imperfections of this
type implies that capital flight-defined as a consequence
of domestic policies and access to opportunities to avoid
their impact 011 private net asset income-has welfare
implications..Itleads to an inefficient allocation ofcapital
across countries and welfare losses for the home country.
These welfare losses arise because domestic savers are
inducedto placetheirassets abroadtoavoid taxationby the
home country. The preferences of intermediaries abroad
over claims in the two countries differ from those of
domestic intermediaries. This means that the supply
ofcapital abroadrises with capital flight while the stockof
capital. at home declines. This contrasts with the case
of perfect international capital mobility in which foreign
lenders simply took over the task of intermediating be-
tween domestic savers and domestic investors.
One policy remedy when capital income taxation is
desirable is to impose capital controls as before. Again, in
contrast with the analysis ofthe previous section, imposi-
tion ofa residence-based capital income tax does nofleave
the domestic rate of interest equal to the foreign rate of
interest. Foreignintermediaries will notpurchasedomestic
claims until the domestic pre-tax rate ofinterest has risen
sufficiently toovercome the additional costs ofmonitoring
investments in another country.
An interesting extertsion of this result is the case in
which domestic intermediaries do a very poorjobofcredit
selection, perhaps because of government controls on
lending decisions. In this case, moving funds offshore
might increase the effective level of domestic investment
assuming foreign intermediaries can overcome· informa-
tion costs and make better investment decisions.
V. SUBSIDIZATION OFFOREIGN LENDERS
Capital flight often is linked to the socialization ofprivate
external debt or the subsidization of payments on these
debts. This issue was raisedby DiazAlejandro(1984), who
argued that the foreign. exchange earnings accruing to
private assets placed abroad were unavailable to the gov-
ernment that is obliged to make interest payments to
nonresidents. Private external debt appears to have fi-
nancedthe accumulationofclaimsonnonresidents thatare
placed outside the reach of domestic governments. When
these debts are subsidized, the governmentbears aburden
while foreign investors and the private domestic claimant
receive the benefits.
Subsidies to foreign capital inflows often take the form
of contingent subsidies, providing insurance to nonresi-
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Policies that subsidize nonresident holders of domestic
assets lead to capital flight ifthe subsidies allow external
debt to finance residents' purchases of claims on nonresi-
dents that generate income untaxable by the government.
Suchsubsidies may occurthrough contingentliabilities for
the government. In this case, the social costofthe subsidies
is the utility reduction due to a loss of national income
equal to the total subsidy paid to foreign lenders. There
also can be domestic distributional effects that may be of
concern to policymakers in a world with heterogeneous
households (Alesinaand Tabellini 1989). Itshouldbe noted
that this process also could concern foreign investors. As
the tax base for raising the revenue needed for repayment
erodes and the likelihood that the government will realize
large contingent liabilities rises, foreign holders ofdomes-
tic claims enjoying public guarantees may anticipate re-
negotiation by the government. That is, foreign investors
may realize the ability and willingness ofthe government
to honor these explicit or implicit contingent commit-
ments. Anticipating the possibility of such capital levies,
nonresidents should behave in a time-consistent fashion.
The possibility that subsidies and guarantees generated
lending to developing countries that led up to the 1982 debt
crisis suggests that recent large private capital inflows to
developing countries also might be a cause for concern. It
seems likely to us thatonce againprivate capitalinflows are
being sustained not only by the more favorable investment
climate, but also by opportunities generated by the govern-
ments ofdeveloping countries. The form ofthe incentive is
a little different from the external debt-capital flight pat-
tern that led up to the 1982 debt crisis.
But in one important respect the recent private capital
inflows are similar in that they are sustained by a con-
tingent claim on the government. The distinguishing fea-
ture this time is that recent private capital inflows to
developing countries have taken the form of domestic-
currency-denominated instruments includingequities, cor-
porate bonds, bank deposits, and government securities
(Gooptu 1993). This is certainly different from the dollar-
denominated, government-guaranteed, syndicated credits
that comprised the debt buildup before 1982.
In the current pattern of capital flows it is less obvious
thatthegovernmentoftheborrowingcountryhas provideda
guarantee. However an implicit guarantee is provided by
the increasingly popular use ofthe exchange rate as an an-
chor for inflationary expectations. In basing its credibility
on the maintenance of a fixed or managed exchange rate,
the government, in effect, provides an exchange rate guar-
antee for the investor in domestic-currency-denominated
instruments.
This, ofcourse, seems to leave the investor with acredit
risk. But in most emerging markets the government is very
likely to provide acredit guarantee as well as the exchange
rate guarantee. In cases where international investors buy
government securities, the guarantee is explicit. Commer-
cial bank deposits also are guaranteed, especially where
the deposit is denominated in domestic currency.
Finally, even the liabilities of domestic nonfinancial
corporations carry a strong government backup. This is
because such firms are heavily indebted to the domestic
banking system. Ifnonresident creditors want out, these
firms can be expected to ask for andreceive creditfrom the
domestic banks. To refuse would depress the market value
ofthe banks' existing claims on the domestic firms and call
into question the solvency ofthe domestic banking system.
What limits this process? As long as the developing
country's centralbankmaintains domestic nominal interest
rates at levels above those available on similar foreign
assets then, in principle, there is no limit to the private
capital inflows generated. Ofcourse, in reality the govern-
ment's resources are limited. At some pointthe market will
begin to doubt the government's ability to maintain the
exchange rate peg and the negative carry resulting from
the low returnearnedonreserves relativeto thatpaidonthe
domestic liabilities issued in sterilized exchange market
intervention. Butthe scale ofprivate capital inflows neces-
sary to exhaust the central bank's expected net worth can
be very large indeed.
VI. CONCLUSION
We define flight capital as the accumulation ofclaims on
nonresidents by residents that escape control ofthe domes-
tic government. Capitalflight bythis definitionis estimated
by a calculation of gross external claims that generate
income that is notreportedin the balance ofpayments data.
Our approach emphasizes the importance of public
policies and anticipated policies for the domestic govern-
ment in the presence ofinternational capital mobility and
possible evasion oftaxation or appropriation by the home
government by domestic savers. Capital flight represents
an arbitrage of the different treatment of resident and
nonresident investors by domestic authorities.
The policies thatgive rise to capitalflight are distortion-
ary inthe model presentedhere, butthey are not necessarily
simply undesirable. In the case of optimal public goods
supply without lump-sum taxes, a residence-based capital
incometaxispartoftheefficientpolicy, iftaxcomplianceis
perfect. Theproblemofsocialwelfare losses arisesbecause
tax avoidance (or evasion) is possible. The second-best
solution with capital controls includes residence-based
taxes. Without feasible capital controls, the residence-
based capital income tax is entirely ineffective for raising
revenue under perfectinternational capital mobility. In thiscase, the social cost ofcapital flight is the welfare cost of
losing ausefulinstrumentoffiscal policy. Capitalflight also
can result from the adoption ofdistortionary policies that
are not welfare-improving. Intheseinstances, itcanexacer-
bate the welfare losses.
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